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Abstract 
This paper reviews the  experience  of the five Central  Asian countries in the two  decades  since 
independence. In the 1990s the five countries looked like a natural experiment. They had 
similar initial conditions,  but different  transition  strategies. Today  that  does not appear to have been a 
useful research agenda, which raises some broader questions for comparative economic studies. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the collapse of central planning in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, an active and urgent debate ensued on the merits of alternative strategies for the 
transition to a market-based economy. In econometric studies of economic 
performance (typically measured by change in GDP) the strongest results were for 
variables that picked up the difference between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, whether measured as distance from Düsseldorf or years under Communism or 
levels of human capital, and for some obvious negative correlations (e.g. between 
growth and war or hyperinflation). The extensive literature produced little or no 
consensus on the relative merits of gradual versus rapid transition or on the optimum 
sequencing of reform, because beyond the similarities of a Communist regime and 
central planning the thirty-something transition economies were a diverse group.
3 
                                                 
1 Keynote speech given at the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies annual 
conference on 26-28 August 2010 in Tartu (Estonia). This paper draws on material in Pomfret (2010a 
and 2010b) and in “Le passage à l’économie de marché, un bilan contrasté” in M. Laruelle and S. 
Peyrouse (eds.) L’Asie Centrale (Librairie Arthème Fayard, Paris, forthcoming). I am grateful to Michael 
Keren and to particpnaats at the EACES Tartu conference for helpful comments and suggestions on 
the original presentation. 
2 Professor of Economics, University of Adelaide, Adelaide SA 5005 Australia and (for 2010-11) Visiting 
Professor of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center, via Belmeloro 11, Bologna, 
Italy; e-mail: richard.pomfret@adelaide.edu.au 
3 The dominant textbook on transition (Roland, 2000) extolled the benefits of gradualism, while one of 
the most widely read books on transition (Åslund, 2007) argued that only drastic and radical reform 
succeeded. The econometric literature of the 1990s is reviewed in World Bank (2002, 11-20) and 
Pomfret (2002, chapter 4). After 2000 the econometric growth literature almost dried up; the most 
influential article (Falcetti et al., 2002) found that country-specific initial conditions dominated, which 
implies that the group of transition economies was so heterogeneous that cross-country differences in 
the initial year swamped the impact of policy choices in determining economic performance. Dwindling 
interest in “transition” as a research topic was reflected in the contrast between the plethora of 
publications assessing the first decade and relative absence of assessments at the end of the second 
decade (the September 2009 UNU-WIDER Conference ‘Reflections on Transition: Twenty Years After 
The Fall of The Berlin Wall’ in Helsinki and Hölscher (2009) are exceptions).  
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A better basis for comparative analysis may be to take a smaller less 
heterogeneous group of economies. In this paper I ask whether the five Soviet Central 
Asian republics provide such a natural experiment. Apart from their similarity of 
geography and culture, the five Central Asian successor states were, together with 
Azerbaijan, the poorest Soviet republics in 1991. Their role in the Soviet division of 
labour was supplying a small range of primary products (cotton, oil and gas, and 
minerals). The Central Asian republics had no prior history as independent nation states. 
Their territory had been incorporated into the Russian Empire in the nineteenth 
century, so that they had roughly similar lengths of experience in the Tsarist Empire as 
well as the same Soviet history. The republics’ borders were more or less arbitrary 
creations of Stalin; they could conceivably have been amalgamated as the Turkestan 
Soviet Republic, but instead they gained independence in December 1991 as five 
separate states. In four of the five republics, First Secretaries appointed by Mikhail 
Gorbachev became national presidents and quickly established super-presidential 
political regimes, with power heavily concentrated in the executive branch and with 
weak parliaments and legal institutions. The exception was Tajikistan which experienced 
a bitter civil war until 1997, but since then the president has established a super-
presidential system.
4  
When the five Central Asian countries became independent in December 1991, 
the political priority was nation-building. At the same time they faced three major 
economic shocks: the end of central planning, hyperinflation, and the collapse of 
demand and supply chains. Although the central planning system had been abandoned 
in the final years of the Soviet Union, reform had hardly begun in Central Asia, but 
when Russia introduced a big bang liberalization of prices in January 1992 the Central 
Asian countries, which still shared a common currency with Russia, were forced to 
follow. In the transition to a market economy, government spending exceeded revenues 
and inflation accelerated, turning to hyperinflation in 1992-3, which was exacerbated by 
the common currency zone. Finally, when transport networks were nationalized and 
borders were erected, the Central Asian economies were vulnerable to the rapid collapse 
of Soviet-era demand and supply links. 
All five countries suffered serious disruption from the dissolution of the USSR. 
Falling output and rising prices became much worse after the formal dissolution of the 
USSR removed residual central control over the Soviet economic space. Attempts to 
maintain economic links by retaining the ruble as a common currency in 1992-3 were 
abandoned by the end of 1993.
5 After 1993 each national government had considerable 
freedom of action in fiscal and monetary policy and in structural reforms. 
National strategies for transition to a market-based economy varied among the 
five countries, ranging from the most rapid reform of any former Soviet republic in 
                                                 
4 None of the countries has an effective method for peaceful transfer of power. The only replacement of 
an incumbent president has been in the Kyrgyz Republic; in March 2005 President Akayev was ousted 
by the “tulip revolution” and in April 2010 President Bakiyev was forced into exile following street 
violence. The only other change of leader followed the death of President Niyazov in Turkmenistan. 
5 The situation before independence and the immediate post-independence period (1992-3) are 
analysed in Pomfret (1995). Islamov (2001), Gleason (2003) and Pomfret (2006) provide accounts of 
the region’s economic development during the 1990s. Richard Pomfret, Constructing market-based economies in central Asia: A natural experiment? 
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Kyrgyzstan to minimal change in Turkmenistan. Despite similar backgrounds and 
economic challenges and commonalities such as super-presidential political systems 
under autocratic rulers, rampant corruption, geographical obstacles to trade, and 
reluctance to engage in serious regional cooperation, during the 1990s the five countries’ 
economies became more differentiated. The divergence of transition strategies among 
countries with similar initial conditions and unchanging (or hard to change) geographical 
and cultural constraints encouraged researchers to view the five countries as a natural 
experiment of the efficacy of alternative approaches to creating a market-based 
economy. 
The end of the second decade since the dissolution of the Soviet Union is a good 
time for reflection because many developments have taken time to work themselves out 
(Pomfret, 2010a). Table 1 presents summary statistics of initial conditions and outcome 
indicators, Table 2 provides indicators of reform and Tables 3 and 4 report annual data 
on growth and inflation. 
2. Dissolution of the USSR and the Transition from Central Planning 
During the 1990s, the national leaders cemented their personal power by creating 
super-presidential regimes, in which the balance of power between executive and 
legislature was overwhelmingly weighted towards the former. In Tajikistan, the only one 
of the five countries not to evolve peacefully from Soviet republic to independent state 
under unchanged leadership, the bloody civil war dominated political developments 
until 1997 and delayed implementation of a serious and consistent economic strategy, 
but by the end of the decade President Rakhmon had constructed a political system 
similar to that of his neighbours. In the priority task of nation-building the five 
countries have been successful; simply surviving for twenty years was an achievement 
that many did not anticipate in 1991.
6 
What was the economic goal? By 1992 the centrally planned economy had 
collapsed and there was no alternative to creating a market-based economy (although 
there was much discussion of the varieties of capitalism). The experiment thus became 
how to create a market-based economy that could deliver superior economic 
performance, proxied by increased real GDP. 
Which country was most likely to succeed? Viewed from the starting gate, there 
were several potential favourites. The biggest windfall gain from the shift from Soviet 
administrative prices to world prices was expected to go to Turkmenistan: Tarr (1994) 
estimated a terms of trade gain of 50%, second only to Russia among former Soviet 
republics, and well-ahead of third-place Kazakhstan (19%). Kazakhstan, however, had 
the best endowment of human capital, reflected in a per capita income roughly twice as 
high as the average for the four southern Central Asian countries (World Bank, 1992) 
and the country’s substantial energy resources were about to be tapped by the Chevron-
Tengiz oil project - the largest foreign investment agreement in Soviet history. 
Uzbekistan benefitted from the position of Tashkent as the administrative capital of 
Soviet Central Asia, insofar as the new country inherited greater bureaucratic capacity 
                                                 
6 All five countries asserted their sovereignty by joining the United Nations in 1992, and have been 
universally recognized. They have also been successful in avoiding inter-state wars, unlike the Caucasus. 
More surprisingly, civil war (with the exception of Tajikistan) and secession have been avoided.  
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and material (e.g. the large inherited aeroplane stock gave the new national carrier an 
initial edge and inherited military equipment reduced pressure on the defence budget). 
The poorest prospects, apart from Tajikistan which was embroiled in civil war, appeared 
to be those of Kyrgyzstan, which was poorly endowed with human and resource capital 
and geographically isolated. However, poor prospects could be an advantage if they 
pushed the country into more radical (and more appropriate) reform. 
Which country won the race in the 1990s?  Ba s e d on re a l G D P in 19 99 a s a  
percentage of 1989 GDP, the answer is clear. All former Soviet republics experienced a 
transitional recession, but the decline was least in Uzbekistan. The worst-performing 
Central Asian economy, unsurprisingly, was Tajikistan. The other three countries had 
more or less identical performances, with GDP about a third lower in 1999 than in 1989 
(Table 3), despite the diversity of transition strategies.
7 
Why was Uzbekistan so successful? The main explanations have been in terms of 
a gradual transition strategy, favourable world market conditions for its major export, 
cotton, and good administration (and favourable inheritance from the Soviet era).
8 
These are not necessarily competing explanations, and there is some interaction. 
Gradualism reduced the magnitude of the short-term transitional recession compared to 
countries adopting rapid reform. Good administration helped to reduce the output fall, 
e.g. maintenance of irrigation channels and ginning facilities kept cotton output up in 
contrast to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan where cotton output declined. Compared to 
elsewhere in Central Asia, some state enterprises were relatively successful in the early 
and mid-1990s, e.g. Uzbekistan Airways provided the best international air services and 
turned Tashkent airport into the regional hub. However, what transformed these factors 
into the best performance in the former Soviet Union was the 1992-5 upturn in world 
cotton prices (Figure 1) combined with the relative ease of transporting cotton to world 
markets. 
Uzbekistan’s success was seized upon by some participants in the virulent debate 
about the appropriate speed of reform as evidence of the benefits of gradualism.
9 On 
                                                 
7 National accounts data for the Central Asian countries should be treated with caution, especially for the 
1990s, and data for Turkmenistan are especially dubious. Various biases apply to the levels of GDP 
(Pomfret 2003), and hence to magnitude of changes reported here Nevertheless, there is little argument 
about the rankings of the five countries’ performance in the 1990s. 
8 Corruption was, and still is, widespread in all of Central Asia, but available evidence suggested lower 
levels in Uzbekistan than in the other four countries. Among the twenty transition economies covered 
by the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance survey (reported in the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development’s Transition Report 1999), Uzbekistan ranked about fourth for 
lack of corruption, ahead of several European countries generally considered to be transition leaders. 
9 There are doubts about whether the gradualism - shock therapy dichotomy actually captures 
Uzbekistan’s transition strategy in the mid-1990s. In areas such as small-scale privatization, housing and 
price reform, Uzbekistan was a relatively quick and extensive liberalizer, and the stabilization program 
introduced in January 1994 was a standard IMF policy package, even though the government presented 
it as home-grown macropolicy. Less sensibly, in 1997 the Uzbek government took pleasure in 
identifying its forex controls with those of Malaysia in a group of high-performing IMF-deniers, 
although Malaysia’s controls were milder and more rapidly dismantled. Uzbekistan’s average EBRD 
transition index was higher than Kazakhstan’s until 1998 (e.g. in Transition Report 1998, Table 2.2.1, the 
unweighted average of the EBRD’s eight indicators on an ascending scale of 1-4 was for Kazakhstan Richard Pomfret, Constructing market-based economies in central Asia: A natural experiment? 
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the other hand, supporters of “shock therapy” (or Big Bang reforms) argued that 
Uzbekistan had failed to lay the foundations for sustained economic growth. Their 
scepticism was borne out by Uzbekistan’s mediocre performance in the next decade, but 
that had less to do with gradualism than with poor policies. When cotton prices fell in 
the second half of 1996, Uzbekistan resorted to draconian foreign exchange controls to 
maintain state control over the rents from cotton. The controls bred a series of policies 
injurious to a well-functioning market economy, while the systemic nature of the 
controlled economy inhibited further piecemeal reform.  
Turkmenistan illustrated the dangers of gradual or non-existent reform. As in 
Uzbekistan, the government reaped substantial rents from cotton exports in 1992-6, and 
responded to the price downturn by imposing forex controls in 1998. By that time the 
economy was encountering serious problems because cotton output was declining and 
the other major export, gas, went through pipelines to monopsonist buyers who did not 
pay their bills; in 1997-9 Turkmenistan cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in an attempt to 
enforce payment. Meanwhile, the cotton and gas rents had been used for inefficient 
populist subsidies, spent on grandiose projects to boost the presidential personality cult, 
and wasted on import-substitution projects with negative value-added (Pomfret, 2001). 
The regime isolated the country from outside influences and survived by ruthless 
repression. Economic performance improved in the second decade not because of good 
policies, but because Turkmen gas became more valuable in the 2000s as bargaining 
power shifted from buyers to sellers. 
Kyrgyzstan embraced rapid change and created the most liberal regime in the 
region. Prices and foreign trade were fully liberalized and small-scale privatization was 
completed. In July 1998, the Kyrgyz Republic became the first Soviet successor state to 
accede to the World Trade Organization. Despite the reforms, however, Kyrgyz 
performance in the 1990s was average. Critics of shock therapy blamed the policies, 
while supporters argued that more time was needed before positive results would be 
seen. In fact, economic performance in the 2000s was not outstanding either. Some 
argued that poor institutions negated the policy reforms, but without identifying the 
nature of the poor institutions this was unhelpful. 
Kazakhstan was also seen as a rapid reformer, but less consistently so than 
Kyrgyzstan, In 1992 Kazakhstan followed Russia’s sweeping price reform with fewer 
exceptions than other Central Asian countries, but as the 1990s progressed Kazakhstan 
also resembled Russia in the way that privatization created powerful private interests 
that distorted the reform process. By the end of the 1990s Kazakhstan had similar 
transition indicators to Kyrgyzstan, with less complete trade liberalization but a better 
functioning financial sector and more reformed infrastructure (Table 2). These two 
countries were the most successful in stabilizing the macroeconomy, bringing inflation 
below fifty percent in 1995 and 1996 respectively, but both had disappointing economic 
performances in the 1990s. 
In Tajikistan the civil war destroyed the planned economy and effectively 
privatized economic activity without the institutions, such as security of contract, crucial 
to efficient operation of a market economy. In Table 2 Tajikistan scores highly on price 
                                                                                                                                        
2.1, the Kyrgyz Republic 2.9, Tajikistan 1.9, Turkmenistan 1.5 and Uzbekistan 2.3, although in the 
following year Kazakhstan ranked above Uzbekistan)  
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liberalization and privatization, but poorly on enterprise reform or competition policy, 
and abysmally on financial sector reform or infrastructure. After the 1997 peace 
agreement Tajikistan was considered to be a delayed reformer with liberalization of 
trade and financial sector policies, but institutions remained weak. The economic decline 
in Tajikistan was traumatic; by 2000, with a national income per capita of $180, 
Tajikistan was poorer than most of sub-Saharan Africa or the poorest countries of Asia.  
3. Economic Performance during the Second Decade after Independence 
Central Asia experienced a huge economic shock in the early 1990s. As stated 
above, Uzbekistan’s conomy suffered a smaller transitional recession than any other 
former Soviet republic, and experienced positive economic growth after the mid-1990s. 
The Uzbek case was cited by supporters of gradual reform, as was the relative failure of 
more reformist Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, most commentators agreed that 
the real test of the strategies pursued by the Central Asian countries would be their 
performance in the next decade. 
A striking feature of the decade after 1999 was the lack of further progress in 
creating efficient market economies. As measured by the EBRD Transition Indicators 
there was little change, apart from limited banking reform in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan and further price liberalization and small-scale privatization in Tajikistan 
(Table 2). Turkmenistan was even downgraded on some indicators of its, very limited, 
transition. The general impression is of a blank slate for reform in the early 1990s to 
which Central Asian countries responded in differing ways, but by the turn of the 
century the type of market economy had been fixed in each country and was now only 
amenable to limited further change. 
Many foreign observers expected relative economic performance in the second 
decade to reward those countries which had reformed their systems in the 1990s to 
create more effective market economies and to punish those countries which had held 
back on reform. In practice, outcomes were primarily (and overwhelmingly) determined 
by whether countries had energy resources or not. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
enjoyed rapid growth driven by the rising world price of oil, which had stagnated in the 
dozen years before 1998, but then increased from under $10 a barrel to over $140 in 
2008. Tajikistan enjoyed fairly high growth rates in 2000-4 as domestic peace was 
established, but this was from a low base and the country remained very poor with a 
huge percentage of the male population working abroad, mainly in Russia.
10 
The dominant economic influence in Central Asia from 1999 to 2008 was the 
boom in energy prices. The oilboom was especially important for Kazakhstan whose 
major Caspian oilfields began to produce large quantities of oil after the turn of the 
century, as the first independent pipeline through Russia opened in 2001 and the first 
pipeline to a Mediterranean port opened in 2005. Thus Kazakhstan benefitted from 
                                                 
10 To a lesser extent both the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan experienced substantial out-migration and 
remittances became an important source of family income in the 2000s. The migrants worked mainly in 
Russia and secondly in Kazakhstan, where labour demand was driven by construction booms associated 
with soaring revenues from energy exports. Richard Pomfret, Constructing market-based economies in central Asia: A natural experiment? 
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both higher quantity and higher prices, as well as being in a stronger position to 
negotiate transit fees. 
For Turkmenistan, whose gas reserves are among the world’s largest, the increase 
in energy prices was also a boon. There is no world market for natural gas, whose price 
is dependent on long-term contracts with customers on the pipeline network, but oil 
prices affect demand for gas and hence the relative bargaining power of gas suppliers. 
Higher prices for Russian gas exports to the EU, which are priced by a formula that 
includes oil prices, created pressure to increase the price of Central Asian gas exports to 
Russia. The price paid by Russia to Turkmenistan increased from $44 per 1,000 m
3 in 
2005 to $150 in 2008.
11 The value of Turkmenistan’s GDP increased, but gas output 
grew only slowly and non-gas output stagnated; publicly available data on Turkmenistan 
are poor, but there is anecdotal evidence of substantial inequality and poverty. Although 
the death in December 2006 of President Niyazov (or Turkmenbashi the Great as he 
preferred to be known) fuelled anticipation of policy reform, publicized changes by 
President Berdymukhammedov were largely cosmetic and serious economic reforms 
minimal.  
Growing energy demand stimulated new projects to harness the huge 
hydroelectric potential in the mountainous regions of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Any hydro projects are, however, highly controversial because the rivers 
provide water vital to the irrigated agriculture of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan. In the Soviet era water resources were managed by Moscow; water 
would be released at appropriate times for downstream agriculture and in return the 
Kyrgyz and Tajik republics would be provided with energy. Uzbekistan strongly 
opposes the new hydro projects, and has withheld energy supplies to the upstream 
country during recent winters. 
For Uzbekistan, which is more or less self-sufficient in oil and natural gas, the 
direct impact of the oil boom was roughly neutral, but the indirect effects were 
substantial. Tensions with neighbouring Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan escalated over 
water/energy arrangements. The economic prosperity of Kazakhstan posed a challenge 
to the Uzbek government that had seen itself as the regional leader in the 1990s. 
Tashkent had been the metropolis of Soviet Central Asia and Uzbekistan was the most 
populous of the new independent Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan had higher per 
capita income, and the gap in overall economic size increased substantially after 2000. 
By the mid-2000s, thousands of Uzbek workers were crossing the border to work as 
migrant labour in Kazakhstan, underlining the widening gap in living standards.
12 
Almaty became the regional financial centre and airport hub. 
The dichotomy between energy-rich and energy-poor countries was 
overwhelming in the 2000s, but there may also be a distinction between more and less 
                                                 
11 Russia increased the price paid for Turkmen gas, so that it could free up more Russian gas for export to 
the EU or Ukraine, although before 2005 the payment process was non-transparent (Garcia, 2006; 
Global Witness, 2006; Pomfret, forthcoming). Central Asian exporters exerted further pressure by 
seeking alternative pipeline routes with higher long-term price agreements, e.g. to China (pipeline 
opened in December 2009) or Iran (pipeline opened in 2010) or the EU (pipelines under negotiation). 
12 Olcott (2007) emphasises disappointing economic performance as the main cause of increased unrest 
and repression in Uzbekistan in the 2000s.  
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open economies. Measured by trade/GDP ratios all five are open economies, but this is 
not a good guide to the openness of the economies to non-resource trade and to ideas 
or foreign investment. In these latter respects, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are much 
more closed than Kazakhstan or the Kyrgyz Republic. This is difficult to measure, 
because all five countries have low de jure tariffs and other formal trade policies are not 
restrictive.
13 It is, however, visually self-evident from comparing the shops in Almaty, 
Astana, Atyrau and Aktau, with those in any other Central Asian city. It is also evident 
from the Kyrgyz Republic’s massive bazaars, Dordoi in Bishkek or Kara-su near Osh, 
which cater to a regional market.
14 In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan introduction of 
forex controls and adoption of import-substituting industrialization strategies reinforced 
the closed economy because domestic currencies were not convertible and the import-
substituting industries opposed opening up the economy to competing imports. 
4. The Case of Kazakhstan 
A major obstacle to fulfilling Kazakhstan’s economic potential after independence 
was related to the oil sector. The only outlets for Kazakhstan’s oil were pipelines 
through Russia, and Russia exploited its monopoly position by regulating flows and 
levying high transit fees. Nevertheless, the country’s oil and mineral wealth played a key 
role in Kazakhstan’s economic and political development as the privatization program 
of the mid-1990s led to insiders and politically well-connected people gaining control 
over the valuable assets. The regime became more autocratic and the system more 
corrupt. Economic reform stalled in the mid-1990s. The limited economic reform and 
establishment of crony capitalism inhibited healthy economic development in the 1990s. 
Kazakhstan’s economy was hard-hit by the 1998 Russian crisis. Although the crisis itself 
was exogenous, the contagion effect reflected a relative failure to diversify Kazakhstan’s 
international economic relations away from Russia. 
  After 1999 the economic situation in Kazakhstan turned around. The recovery 
from the 1998 crisis was driven by market forces and by good fortune. A sharp real 
depreciation of the currency stimulated exports; the positive market response to 
changed prices helped to validate policymakers’ understanding of market mechanisms. 
and increased their confidence in economic reforms Recovery of world oil prices, which 
had stagnated from 1986 to 1998 (Figure 2), reinforced the positive trade developments, 
while large new offshore oil discoveries and new pipeline routes created unbounded 
                                                 
13 The main restrictions are administrative and monetary. Although Uzbekistan claimed in 2003 to have 
ended forex controls and established currency convertibility on current account, obstacles to obtaining 
foreign currency remain. In Turkmenistan President Berdymukhammedov unified the exchange rate 
system in 2007, but there too traders seeking to obtain foreign currency encounter obstacles. 
14 Reported imports by the Kyrgyz Republic from China are a small fraction of China’s reported exports 
to the Kyrgyz Republic (e.g. in 2008 China reported exports to the Kyrgyz Republic of $9,213 million, 
while the Kyrgyz statistics indicate imports of $728 million from China (Mogilevsky, 2009, Table 5), 
which the Kyrgyz authorities explain by the predominance of re-exports, but it is impossible to trace 
these trade flows through the free-wheeling entrepots (Kaminski and Raballand, 2009). According to 
estimates by the World Bank (2009), Dordoi employs 55,000 people (and may generate a further 
100,000 jobs indirectly) and has annual sales of around $2.5 billion, making it by far the largest shopping 
mall in Central Asia (albeit if the infrastructure is containers piled three-high).  Richard Pomfret, Constructing market-based economies in central Asia: A natural experiment? 
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optimism. By 2010 Kazakhstan had the dominant regional economy, and Almaty was 
the preeminent regional financial centre. 
  Kazakhstan is difficult to characterize because the institutional developments in 
the 1990s were rapid and idiosyncratic - and subject to further evolution. Jones Luong 
and Weinthal (2010) identify Kazakhstan as a resource-curse country because the natural 
resources were being exploited by foreign private companies under weak state control. 
They highlight the poor institutional development when the state does not rely on 
taxation of individuals and hence does not need the population’s acquiescence in tax 
rates and expenditure decisions. Moreover, the process of privatization and granting of 
oil concession was associated with massive corruption (Pomfret, 2005). Yet despite the 
unpropitious institutional development in the 1990s, institutions are not immutable and 
the management of Kazakhstan’s economy improved during the 2000s. A fortunate 
conjuncture of rising oil prices, increasing oil output and proliferation of transport 
routes for oil exports substantially eased the national budget constraint, allowing the 
President to act as a benevolent father of the nation while those who had benefited 
during the 1990s welcomed establishment of stronger property rights so that they could 
consolidate their gains. 
The 2007-9 financial crisis in Kazakhstan was a symptom of success. A well-
functioning financial system makes risky loans, and in the mid-2000s many would-be 
borrowers were wildly over-optimistic about the economy’s prospects. Kazakhstan’s 
banks erred on the side of overoptimism or poor judgment and made too many bad 
loans, creating a financial crisis. However, the government had built up sufficient 
reserves during the oilboom years that it could act on a large scale to resolve the crisis in 
2008-9 (Pomfret, 2010b). 
 This case study highlights the point that any econometric exercise testing 
relationships between policies and performance in transition economies will encounter 
the difficulty that policies and their consequences are not static. Kazakhstan’s transition 
indicators were set in the 1990s and changed little after 2000, but the economic 
environment evolved in a positive way in the 2000s. In contrast, Uzbekistan’s 
gradualism became associated with poorer performance in the 2000s in large part due to 
the fateful decision in 1996 to renege on a commitment to currency convertibility and 
the subsequent policy stasis. The path dependence in these two countries was related to 
specific events, policies and perhaps presidential personality rather than to a choice 
between gradualism and shock therapy. 
5. Conclusions 
Economic performance in the 1990s was not correlated with the speed and extent 
of transition. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had almost identical GDP 
performance over the decade 1989-99, despite the extensive reforms in Kyrgyzstan and 
the absence of reforms in Turkmenistan. Civil war explains Tajikistan’s poorer 
performance. Uzbekistan was associated with the best GDP performance of any Soviet 
successor state during the 1990s, but the outcome was less positive in the second 
decade. The other large economy, Kazakhstan, appeared to underperform in the 1990s, 
but in the second decade Kazakhstan has been one of the best-performing economies in 
the world. The three smaller countries’ economic performance in their second decade 
has been less positive. Tajikistan is one of the poorest countries in Asia with  
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characteristics of a failed state. The Kyrgyz Republic has also had a disappointing 
economic outcome, despite having introduced market-friendly reforms during the 
1990s. Turkmenistan, despite mismanagement under its first President, has more 
options because of its abundant energy resources, but the nature of the regime remains 
opaque and the unreformed economy is grossly inefficient. 
Variations in economic performance during the 2000s were overwhelmingly 
determined by energy endowments. High energy prices in 1998-2008 powered 
Kazakhstan’s rapid growth, at least until the country ran into a financial crisis in 2007-8, 
and also supported high growth rates in Turkmenistan despite poor policies. Meanwhile, 
Uzbekistan’s regulated economy slipped into the low growth familiar from many 
import-substituting countries of the 1950s and 1960s. The resource-poor and 
landlocked, economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fared even worse. 
The concept of a natural experiment is seductive. However, even among 
apparently similar countries, simple correlations between economic performance and 
policies measured by metrics like the EBRD Transition Indicators are weak. Growth is 
more complex than implementing good policies, having good institutions or managing 
resource endowments efficiently. Growth is like opening a rusty combination lock; 
several tumblers need to be in place, or at least sufficiently aligned so that one can force 
the lock open. Categorizing policies is also more complex than simple rankings by 
EBRD transition indicators or a taxonomy like that of Jones Luong and Weinthal.
15 
Uzbekistan was a cautious reformer in the 1990s, but the crucial distinction is between 
relatively good economic policies in 1994 and 1995 and poor policies after the summer 
of 1996. Kazakhstan started off as a shock therapy reformer in 1992, but quickly 
became distracted by rent-seeking; yet the poor ownership structure of the oil and gas 
sector highlighted by Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) was not static, and the regime 
continued to pursue relatively liberal economic policies.  
 All five countries have established super-presidential political regimes, although 
the degrees of repression differ.
16 Prospects for significant change in economic policies 
in the near future are limited because the entrenched political regimes have little 
incentive to sponsor major reforms. Economic growth may trigger pressures for reform, 
as may change in the domestic political environment, especially in the two largest 
economies where the succession to Presidents Karimov and Nazarbayev is unclear. A 
                                                 
15 Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) categorize resource-based economies by ownership structure and 
state control over resource rents; Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have public ownership and state 
control, Russia private domestic ownership and state control, Azerbaijan private foreign ownership and 
state control, and Kazakhstan private foreign ownership without state control (the worst of all 
combinations in their view). In the 2000s, however, Kazakhstan’s efforts to increase the participation of 
the national energy company in oil and gas projects is similar to the strategies of Russia and Azerbaijan 
despite their different positions in the taxonomy (Pomfret, 2010b). 
16 This may complicate the assessments of economic performance. The greater liberty in the Kyrgyz 
Republic underpins a flourishing market culture and the two largest bazaars, near Osh and in Bishkek, 
cater primarily to Uzbeks; lack of consumer choice and extensive bureaucratic allocation in Uzbekistan 
(and in Turkmenistan) may be associated with lower economic well-being for a given real GDP. On 
repression in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and why they number among the worst of the worst 
repressive regimes in the world, see Gleason (2007) and Olcott (2007). Richard Pomfret, Constructing market-based economies in central Asia: A natural experiment? 
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fundamental question across Central Asia concerns the extent to which an autocratic 
and repressive political regime is consistent with a flourishing market-based economy. 
In autocracies the personality of the leader matters.
17 Kazakhstan’s President 
Nazarbayev is not Mobutu or Turkmenbashi, and he has been willing to change polices 
and act in the common good, as long as it does not affect his grip on power. His role 
model appears to be Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, the father of the nation delivering 
widely shared prosperity. The Kyrgyz Republic has the best prospects for democratic 
evolution, in part because President Akayev went quietly in 2005, rather than turning to 
repression in order to hang on to power. In 2010 the autocracies seem more stable than 
the Kyrgyz Republic, and that will continue as long as the strongmen are strong. But 
there is potential for huge instability when a strongman dies; peaceful successions in 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan do not necessarily predict peaceful successions when 
Nazarbayev or Karimov dies; the model could be post-Soeharto, post Shah of Iran or 
Nigerian power struggles. 
The dichotomy between the more open and more closed Central Asian 
economies is also important for long-run economic development. The openness of the 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz economies contributes to institutional evolution. Civil society is 
relatively strong in Kazakhstan, despite the restricted political system, and emphasis on 
competitiveness is associated with a more open-minded evidence-based approach to 
economic policy. The Kyrgyz Republic has the best immediate prospects of democratic 
political reform and has relative economic freedom, but these benefits could easily 
evaporate if poverty remains widespread.
18 Closed economies have less dynamic 
institutional evolution. Uzbekistan enjoyed favourable initial conditions in terms of 
administrative capacity and in 1993-5 adopted a pragmatic approach to economic policy, 
but after 1996 forex controls and import-substituting industrialization led to policy 
stasis, and an economy closed off from external influences was not exposed to 
demonstration effects that might stimulate change. Turkmenistan is more isolationist, 
and even a change in president has not resulted in significant change to what is an 
obviously malfunctioning economy.  
In sum, simple cross-country comparisons can easily be misleading because 
economies evolve and simple dichotomies such as gradualism/shock therapy or 
democracy/autocracy are too general and indicators are too static. Unicausal 
explanations are invariably inadequate; Uzbekistan’s success in the 1990s reflected a 
combination of gradual reform, relatively efficient economic management and 
favourable world cotton prices, while the magnitude of Kazakhstan’s post-2000 growth 
                                                 
17 This implies that policy choices matter, although a dictator may be more prone to making extreme 
choices in the absence of checks and balances. 
18 The ethnic violence in the southern part of the country in spring 2010 highlighted the danger. Although 
many ethnic Russians had emigrated in the 1990s, the large Uzbek majority remained in their Kyrgyz 
homes in part because they enjoyed greater freedom than in Uzbekistan, including better conditions for 
producing and selling their crops. This was despite ethnic conflicts in 1990 over land rights. In the next 
two decades relations between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the southern regions were peaceful, but the 
violence reignited in May-June 2010. Whatever the catalyst for violence, poverty fuelled the increased 
ethnic tension.   
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depended on having attracted foreign investment before the oilboom.
19 For deeper 
understanding detailed case studies are necessary… but that poses a challenge for 
comparative economic studies!
20 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Demographic Data, Output and Income, 1990-2 and 2008. 
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Kazakhstan  16.3  26.9 
5,120 
4,510 
68  98  15.5  132.2  9,690  61 
Kyrgyzstan 4.4  2.7 
1,810 
1,480 
68 97 5.2  4.4  2,140  45* 
Tajikistan  5.3  2.6 
2,210 
1,480 
63  97  6.7  5.1  1,860  17 
Turkmenistan 3.7  3.2 
2,710 
2,440 
63 98 5.0  18.3 6,210  47 
Uzbekistan  20.5  13.4 
 n.a. 
1,290 
69  97  26.9  27.9  2,660  42 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators at www.worldbank.org (accessed 9 March 2010) 
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Table 2: EBRD Transition Indicators, 1999 and 2008 
  Large scale 
privatisation
Small scale 
privatisatio
n 
Enterprise 
restructuring
Price 
liberalisation
Trade 
& 
Forex 
system
Competition 
Policy 
Banking 
reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation
Securities 
markets & 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions
Overall 
infrastructure 
reform 
Kazakhstan  1999  3.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 3.33  2.00 2.33 2.00  2.00 
2009  3.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 3.67  2.00 2.67 2.67  2.67 
Kyrgyz Republic 1999  3.00  4.00  2.00  4.33  4.33  2.00  2.00  2.00  1.33 
2009  3.67  4.00  2.00  4.33  4.33  2.00  2.33  2.00  1.67 
Tajikistan  1999  2.33 3.00 1.67 3.67 2.67  2.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 
2008  2.33 4.00 1.67 3.67 3.33  1.67 2.33 1.00  1.33 
Turkmenistan 1999  1.67  2.00  1.67  2.67  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
2009  1.00  2.33  1.00  2.67  2.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Uzbekistan  1999 2.67 3.00 2.00 2.67 1.00  2.00 1.67 2.00  1.33 
2009  2.67 3.33 1.67 2.67 2.00  1.67 1.67 2.00  1.67 
Source: EBRD at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm (accessed 9 March 2010). 
Note: Indicators are measured on a scale from 1 (no reform) to 4, with pluses and minuses, e.g. 3+ and 3- are represented by 3.33 and 2.67.  
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Table 3: Growth in Real GDP 1989-2008 (per cent) 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1999;  1989=100 
Kazakhstan 0 0 -13  -3  -9  -13  -8  1 2 -2  2 63 
Kyrgyz Rep  8  3  -5  -19  -16  -20  -5  7  10  2  4  63 
Tajikistan  -3 -2 -7 -29  -11  -19  -13  -4 2  5  4  44 
Turkmenistan  -7  2  -5  -5  -10  -17  -7  -7  -11  5  16  64 
Uzbekistan  4  2  -1 -11  -2 -4 -1 2  3  4  4  94 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report Update, April 2001, 15. 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Kazakhstan  -2 3  10 14 10 9  10 10 11 9  3  1  6 
Kyrgyz Rep  2  4  5  5  0  7  7  0  3  8  8  2  -4 
Tajikistan  5 4 8 10  9 10  11  7 7 8 8 3 6 
Turkmenistan  7  17  19  20  16  17  15  13  11  12  11  6  11 
Uzbekistan  4 4 4 4 4 4 8 7 7 10  9 8 8 
Source: EBRD data at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm (accessed 7December 2010). 
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Table 4: Inflation (change in consumer price index) 1991-2008 (per cent) 
  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997  1998  1999 
Kazakhstan  79 1,381 1,662 1,892 176  39 17 8  7 
Kyrgyz Republic  85  855  772  229  41  31  26  36  12 
Tajikistan  112  1,157  2,195  350 609 418  88  28  43 
Turkmenistan  103  493  3,102  1,748  1,005  992  84  24  17 
Uzbekistan  82  645 534 1,568  305 54  59  29  18 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report Update, April 2001, 16. 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Kazakhstan  7 8 13  8 6 6 7 8 9 11  17  7 7 
Kyrgyz Republic  11  36  19  7  2  3  4  5  6  10  25  7  6 
Tajikistan  43 28 33 39 12 16 7  7  10 13 21 6  8 
Turkmenistan  17  24  8  12  9  6  6  11  8  6  15  -3  5 
Uzbekistan  29 29 25 27 27 12 7  10 14 12 13 14 10 
Source: EBRD at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm (accessed 7 December 2010). 
Notes: 2010 = preliminary figures. 
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Figure 1: World Cotton Prices (Cotlook A Index), Annual Averages, January 1991 to July 2009, US cents per pound. 
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Figure 2: Oil Prices 1987 - 2009, US dollars per barrel 
 
  Source: US Energy Information Administration at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wtotworldw.htm  